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Abstract
Two approaches to emissions trading are cap-and-trade, in which
an aggregate cap on emissions is distributed in the form of allowance
permits, and baseline-and-credit, in which ﬁrms earn emission reduc-
tion credits for emissions below their baselines. Theoretical consid-
erations suggest the long-run equilibria of the two plans will diﬀer if
baselines are proportional to output, because a variable baseline is
equivalent to an output subsidy. This paper reports on a laboratory
experiment designed to test the prediction in a laboratory environ-
ment in which subjects representing ﬁrms choose emission technologies
and output capacities. A computerized environment has been created
in which subjects participate in markets for emission rights and for
output. Demand for output is simulated. All decisions are tracked
through a double-entry bookkeeping system. Our evidence supports
the theoretical prediction that aggregate output and emissions are in-
eﬃciently high under a baseline-and-credit trading plan compared to
a corresponding cap-and-trade plan.
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11 Introduction
Emissions trading is now well established as a method of regulating emis-
sions of uniformly mixed pollutants. The classic analysis assumes that the
regulatory authority sets an aggregate cap on emissions from a set of sources
and then divides the cap into a number of tradable permits (frequently called
allowances), each of which authorizes the discharge of a unit quantity of emis-
sions. Although the allowances could be sold at auction to raise revenue, the
most frequently discussed plans assume that the permits will be distributed
to the regulated ﬁrms on some ad hoc basis. Firms then trade the allowances,
establishing a market price. In equilibrium, individual ﬁrms choose emissions
such that the marginal cost of abating pollution equals the allowance price.
They redeem allowances equal to the emissions discharged, selling or banking
the remainder. If emissions exceed the initial distribution of allowances the
ﬁrm must purchase allowances to cover the excess. Such plans are generally
known as cap-and-trade plans. A good example is the U.S. EPA’s sulphur
dioxide auction.
Many ﬁeld implementations of emissions trading take a diﬀerent ap-
proach. An example is the clean development mechanism proposed under
the Kyoto Protocol. In these baseline-and-credit plans there is no explicit
cap on aggregate emissions. Instead, each ﬁrm has the right to emit a cer-
tain baseline level of emissions. This baseline may be derived from historical
emissions or from a performance standard that speciﬁes the permitted ratio
of emissions to output. Firms create emission reduction credits by emit-
ting fewer than their baseline emissions. These credits may be banked or
sold to ﬁrms who exceed their baselines. The eﬀect is to limit aggregate
2emissions to an implicit cap equal to the sum of the individual baselines.
Typical baseline-and-credit plans also diﬀer from classic cap-and-trade in a
number of institutional details. For example, credits are often computed on
a project-by-project basis rather than on the basis of enterprise-wide emis-
sions. They must be certiﬁed and registered before they can be traded and
there are generally restrictions that credits cannot be registered until the
emission reductions have actually occurred.
Baseline-and-credit plans are theoretically equivalent to a cap-and-trade
plan if the cap implicit in the baseline-and-credit plan is ﬁxed and numerically
equal to the ﬁxed cap in a cap-and-trade plan. In many cases, however, the
baseline is computed by multiplying a measure of ﬁrm scale (energy input
or product output) by a performance standard specifying a required ratio of
emissions to input or output.1 In this case, the implicit cap on aggregate
emissions varies with the level of aggregate output. Fischer (2001, 2003)
refers to such plans as tradable performance standards.
The variable baseline in a baseline-and-credit plan introduces a critical
diﬀerence in long-run performance compared to cap-and-trade with the same
implied performance standard.2 Speciﬁcally, the variable baseline acts as a
subsidy on output. Firms receiving this subsidy will tend to expand their
capacity to produce output. This introduces two potential ineﬃciencies. If
the performance standard remains the same in both plans, the baseline-and-
credit plan will exhibit higher output, emissions, and external costs. If, in-
stead, the performance standard under baseline-and-credit is tightened so as
1This ratio is often called the emission intensity or emission rate.
2A cap-and-trade plan with aggregate cap on emissions may be said to imply a per-
formance standard of rs = E/Q where E and Q are respectively aggregate emissions and
output in long run equilibrium.
3to meet the aggregate emissions speciﬁed under cap-and-trade, then industry
costs will increase due to unnecessarily tight restrictions on emitting ﬁrms
(Muller 1999; Dewees 2001; Fischer, 2001, 2003). It should be noted that
this reasoning presumes that ﬁrms are adjusting to pollution regulation on
two margins: the emission rate of output and the level of output itself. More-
over the reasoning is essentially long-run in that output is changed by ﬁrms’
investing or divesting themselves of productive capacity and equilibrium is
computed by imposing a zero-proﬁt restriction on ﬁrms in the market.
Currently, both cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit plans are being
implemented at similar rates at the international level (Hasselknippe 2003).
However, the predictions on the relative performance of baseline-and-credit
versus cap-and-trade have not been tested in the laboratory. Thus far, exper-
iments have been fruitful in shaping cap-and-trade public policy (Cason 1995;
Cason and Plott 1996), but as of yet no baseline-and-credit laboratory stud-
ies have been published. Laboratory implementation of baseline-and-credit
trading would serve several goals: it would verify that market processes are
suﬃcient to drive agents to competitive equilibrium, demonstrate the con-
trast between baseline-and-credit and cap-and-trade to policy makers, and
possibly create a vehicle for training policy-makers and practitioners in the
nature of alternative emission trading plans.
We have undertaken a long-term research project to compare the prop-
erties of baseline-and-credit and cap-and-trade plans in the lab. In previous
work (Buckley, Muller, and Mestelman 2005b) we have developed a tractable
model with constant returns to scale in production and multiple ﬁrm types.
We have implemented a computerized lab environment with explicit capac-
4ity and emission rate decision, fully speciﬁed markets for emission rights and
output, and a complete accounting framework. We have demonstrated that
predicted results hold in simulated markets with robot traders adjusting on
both the output and emissions intensity margins. However, market instabil-
ity occurs when capacity is freely adjustable, so we have implemented work
with human subjects slowly, examining the emissions rate margin and the
output market margin one at a time.
Buckley (2004) reports on six sessions comparing baseline-and-credit with
cap-and-trade when ﬁrm capacities are ﬁxed and ﬁrm adjustment is limited
to emission rate. The investigation seeks to conﬁrm the prediction that the
outcome of the two approaches would be the same when the output subsidy
inherent to the baseline-and-credit plan can not possibly lead to productive
expansion. Any deviation from parallel results could be then laid to the in-
stitutional diﬀerences between the two plans rather than the implied subsidy
on output and emissions. The study conﬁrms that the overall predictions on
emissions hold. Eﬃciency in the market was improved, although only about
one-half the available gains from trade were realized. However there were
some deviations from the benchmark values computed under the assumption
of a perfectly competitive equilibrium. Emission permit prices were higher
under baseline-and-credit trading and inventories of permits were irrationally
high in both treatments.
Buckley, Muller, and Mestelman (2005a) report on six sessions investi-
gating the complementary problem of adjustment on the capacity margin.
That is, ﬁrm emission technologies are held constant at their optimal lev-
els and ﬁrms are allowed to change their productive capacity each decision
5period. The study conﬁrms that when ﬁrms can make adjustments only on
the margin of output capacity, baseline-and-credit trading exhibits higher
output and emissions and lower eﬃciency that a comparable cap-and-trade
plan. However, as reported in Buckley (2004), emission permit prices were
found to be higher under baseline-and-credit trading than under cap and
trade. Unlike in the environment reported by Buckley (2004), inventories of
permits were extraordinarily high only in the baseline-and-credit treatments
when output capacity was variable.
In this paper we investigate the full long-run model in which ﬁrms make
choices on both the emission technology and output capacity margins. We
have three objectives. First we wish to see whether market forces are suﬃ-
ciently strong as to generate and maintain a competitive equilibrium. Sec-
ondly, we are particularly interested in demonstrating that the baseline-and-
credit policy leads to higher emissions and output than occur under cap-
and-trade. Thirdly, we wish to test whether the relatively high permit prices
and inventories found under baseline-and-credit trading in the previous sin-
gle margin experiments, persist in a more realistic long-run setting in which
ﬁrms make decisions on both margins.
2 Experimental Design
We ran six laboratory sessions (three cap-and-trade and three baseline-and-
credit), each involving 8 subjects, in February and March of 2005. Subjects
were recruited from the general population of undergraduates at McMaster
University. Each session of the experiment was conducted in two separate
parts. During the ﬁrst two hour part of each session, students received in-
6structions and participated in 4 training periods using an alternate set of
parameters. This training exercise was rewarded by a ﬂat fee of $45. Sub-
jects then returned a week later to complete the second two hour part of the
session in which they participated in 20 paid rounds using the parameters
reported here. After 20 rounds they were informed of their results and paid
privately in cash. Subjects earned between $12.00 and $71.25 with a mean
of $46.14, not including the $45 training fee from the week earlier. The soft-
ware implementation of the environment detailed below was programmed at
McMaster University using Borland’s Delphi programming environment and
the MySQL open source database.3
Testing the two competing trading mechanisms requires a relatively com-
plex experimental environment. Unlike most emission trading experiments
which tend to focus on individual aspects of the trading mechanism (e.g.
Cason 1995; Cason and Plott 1996), our experiment is conducted within
a fully speciﬁed institutional framework, much like previous cap-and-trade
work by Godby, Mestelman, Muller, and Welland (1997), Ben-David, Brook-
shire, Burness, McKee, and Schmidt (1999) and Muller, Mestelman, Sprag-
gon, and Godby (2002). To date, there has been no work published on
baseline-and-credit experiments outside of those generated by this project.
Also, there has been no published cap-and-trade experiments involving ﬁrms
making both emission technology and output capacity decisions. Given this,
environments reported by Ben-David et al. (1999) and Murphy and Stran-
lund (2005) are most relevant to this study, as the former involves ﬁrms with
ﬁxed output choosing explicit emission technologies, and the latter involves
3See Appendix A and B posted at http://www.economics.mcmaster.ca/econ/mceel/ for
the laboratory instructions and screenshots of the computerized environment, respectively.
7ﬁrms with ﬁxed emission technologies choosing output levels (albeit under
an exogenous capacity constraint).
Other than Ben-David et al. (1999), most fully speciﬁed experimental
emission trading environments assume ﬁxed output levels and implicitly de-
ﬁned emission abatement technology choices. In these experiments, subjects
trade emission permits; their permit holdings at the end of each period (di-
vided by their exogenous output) implicitly determine their ﬁrm’s emission
rate. In these environments, the diﬀerence between choosing a sub-optimal
emission rate and an error made while trading permits can not be identi-
ﬁed. Ben-David et al. (1999), however, examine a model with exogenously
ﬁxed output in which ﬁrms with diﬀering and chosen abatement technologies
attempt to achieve an optimal allocation of abatement and permits. Their
objective is to test hypotheses regarding how abatement and cost heterogene-
ity aﬀect eﬃciency and permit trading volume and price. This environment
involves subjects making an explicit choice of emission rate: subjects trade
permits and then choose one of three possible abatement technology levels.
Despite adding to the complexity of the experimental environment, the au-
thors implement an explicit emission rate choice to allow them to distinguish
between emission rate/technology choice errors and permit trading errors.4
The experimental environment created for the work presented in this
paper is similar to that described in Ben-David et al. (1999) with the addition
of a market for output, the introduction of an output capacity decision, and
an increase in the range of possible emission technologies from 3 to 10. A fully
4The authors model their abatement technology decision as being “irreversible”. Once
a cleaner technology, or lower emission rate, has been chosen, the ﬁrm cannot revert back
to a dirtier technology at a later decision period.
8speciﬁed environment with an emission permit market, an output market, an
explicit emission technology choice and an output capacity choice is required
to test our theoretical predictions concerning the alternative emission trading
plans in a long-run setting. In order to focus on market features important
to our theoretical predictions, the experimental setting necessarily abstracts
from many additional market characteristics which would exist in a naturally
occurring setting. Failure to abstract would possibly make the experimental
setting too complex. Thus, we impose full compliance, abstracting from
issues of penalties and monitoring. Compliance is enforced by restricting
output by the ﬁxed capacity level and the current holding of emission permits.
Firms are not able to sell output if they do not have the required amount of
permits to redeem.
Subjects were told that they represented ﬁrms which create emissions
while producing output and selling it on a simulated market. We chose
not to present the experiment in neutral terms, because we believed that
the explicit emissions trading environment would help subjects understand
the nature of the decisions they were making. We employed a design using
four types of ﬁrms, from A to D, possessing diﬀerent marginal abatement
cost (MAC) schedules. The type D “dirty” ﬁrms have the steepest MAC
curves, the type A “cleanest” have the ﬂattest. There were two subjects
of each type in each session. Subjects were presented with MAC curves
represented by step functions. These functions are broken down into nine
steps corresponding to emission rate possibilities ranging in integer values
between 0 and 9. While Ben-David et al. (1999) implement an explicit
emission rate choice with three possible levels, results from robot simulations
9reported in Buckley et al. (2005a) provide evidence that MAC functions
with a limited number of steps may contribute to volatility of permit prices,
emission rates and aggregate emissions. MAC functions for this experiment
are implemented with nine steps so as to make the function more continuous
without making the environment too complex.
Each ﬁrm was initially given four units of productive capacity, k, which
they could raise or lower by one unit at the end of each decision round.
During each decision round, output could be produced at zero marginal cost
up to the ﬁxed capacity. Each ﬁrm created external costs proportional to
its emissions, although the instructions did not explicitly inform subjects of
this. The marginal damage of emissions (not provided to the subjects) was
assumed constant at $16 per unit of emissions. These parameters were chosen
to equate the marginal social cost (MSC) of each ﬁrm so that all could be
present in ﬁnal equilibrium.5 Figure 1 illustrates the short- and long-run cost
curves for a typical ﬁrm and Figure
There were two treatments: Cap-and-Trade and Baseline-and-Credit. In
both treatments subjects were started oﬀ at the cap-and-trade equilibrium,
which was chosen to coincide with the social optimum. In the cap-and-
trade treatment, 160 permits were distributed each period and aggregate
production capacity began at 32 units of output. This implies an average
emission rate of ﬁve at the social optimum. We expect the system to remain
stable at the equilibrium point. In the baseline-and-credit, treatment we
imposed a tradable performance standard of 5, equivalent to the average
emission rate in the cap-and-trade treatment. In this treatment we expect
5Marginal social cost equals unit capacity cost plus the external costs created by each
unit of output. For our parameters MSC equals 160 for all four ﬁrm types.
10Figure 1: Firm Cost Curves
the output and emissions to increase due to the inherent subsidy to output.
The treatments diﬀered slightly in the sequence of decisions. A ﬂowchart
is provided as Figure 2. In the cap-and-trade treatment subjects begin with
capacity and allowance holdings determined in the previous period. They
receive an endowment of allowances. Their ﬁrst action is to trade allowances
in a multiple-unit uniform-price sealed bid-ask auction (call market).6 Sub-
jects were permitted to place up to three bids for additional permits. Each
6For our purposes, keeping the market institution constant across treatments is essen-
tial. A multi-unit uniform price sealed bid-ask auction was chosen because of the relatively
quick trading time and high eﬃciency associated with it. As discussed by Smith, Williams,
Bratton, and Vannoni (1982), while traders have incentives to bid below values and ask
above costs, traders of infra-marginal units near the margin that determine price should
fully reveal costs and values to avoid being excluded from the market by extra-marginal
units. Therefore, misrepresentation is not expected to aﬀect the uniform market clearing
price.
11Figure 2: Sequence of Events in a Typical Period
12bid was accompanied by a speciﬁed number of units. Subjects were also al-
lowed to place up to three asks: each speciﬁed a number of units the subject
was willing to sell at a speciﬁed price. This action required subjects to esti-
mate the price they are willing to pay for additional permits and the price
at which they are willing to sell their permits. They were provided with
extensive on-screen help to aid them in this decision. Once all bids and asks
were submitted, the allowance market cleared, determining a price of permits
and a quantity bought or sold for each subject. Each subject was then re-
quired to produce and oﬀer for sale as much output as possible, given output
capacity and permit holdings. This amount was computed and submitted
to the output market automatically. Demand for output was represented by
an exogenous demand function with known intercept and slope. The output
market then cleared, determining a common output price and an individual
quantity sold and revenue earned for each subject. After reviewing their ﬁ-
nancial report for the period, subjects decide whether to increase or decrease
capacity by one unit.
The baseline-and-credit sequence was identical to cap-and-trade except
that subjects do not receive any emission permits before the credit market
opens. Consequently, they can only trade credits which were produced in
previous periods. The quantity of credits created in the current period is
determined by the ﬁrm’s emission rate and its quantity of output sold, and
so can only credited after output for the current period was determined.7
7As mentioned in the introduction, this lag in credit supply mimics the institutional
framework found in most real-world baseline-and-credit systems.
133 Parameterization and Benchmarks
In this section we derive benchmark equilibria for the two treatments un-
der the assumption of perfect competition. These benchmarks are derived
from a static model even though our experimental environment is inherently
dynamic. This will allow us to investigate whether these models, which are
typical of the ﬁeld, are useful in predicting the outcomes in real emission
trading markets. We ﬁrst introduce some notation and describe the gen-
eral model which allows adjustment on both the emission rate and output
margins. Secondly we report on the parameterization of the model for this
experiment, and ﬁnally present the benchmarks.
3.1 Theory
This theoretical model is a multi-ﬁrm partial equilibrium model based on
the representative agent model used by Fischer (2003). At the basis of the
model is an industry with a ﬁxed number of perfectly competitive price-
taking ﬁrms. Quality of output is ﬁxed and homogeneous between ﬁrms. We
begin by assuming constant marginal costs of output. The predictions do
not require more realistic and complicated assumptions so the experimental
environment is kept as simple as possible.
Consider an industry with N ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm i ∈ [1,...,N] produces qi
units of output at an emission rate of ri =
ei
qi, where ei represents quantity
of emissions. Industry output is Q =
PN





i=1 riqi. Environmental damages are assumed to be a
positive and weakly convex function of total emissions: D = D(E), D0(E) >
0 and D00(E) ≥ 0. Willingness-to-pay for the output is a weakly concave
14function of aggregate output, WTP =
R Q
0 P(z)dz, where P = P(Q) is an
inverse demand curve with positive ordinate (P(0) > 0) and negative slope
(P 0(Q) < 0). The private cost of production is a linear homogenous function
of output and emissions: Ci = Ci(qi,ei) = qiCi(1,ri). Unit cost Ci(1,ri) can
be separated into unit capacity cost ci(ri), which is a positive and declining
function of the emission rate with ci(ri) > 0 and c0
i(ri) ≤ 0, and unit variable
cost wi, which is a constant function of output. Consequently, total cost is
Ci = ci(ri)qi + wiqi. Note that the marginal cost of output is ci(ri) + wi





general form for the unit capacity cost function8 is,
ci(ri) = u0 + (u1 − u0)[(rmax − ri)/rmax]
αi. (1)
An omnipotent social planner would choose an emission rate and output
for each ﬁrm in order to maximize total surplus, S. The total surplus is
composed of the consumer’s willingness-to-pay for the output minus ﬁrm
costs and environmental damage caused by output production. The social


























∗) ∀i ∈ N (3)
8As previously mentioned, ﬁrms can choose emission rates from 0 to 9 in our envi-
ronment, sormax is set to 9. Steps of the relevant MAC function can be found by cal-
culating the cost diﬀerences between integer emission rate values between 0 and 9 (i.e.











∗) ∀i ∈ N (4)
with qi and ri greater than zero.
These conditions require that each ﬁrm’s operations be optimized on two
margins. The eﬃcient abatement condition (3) ensures that abatement is
both cost minimizing, since the marginal abatement cost (MAC) is equated
across ﬁrms, and surplus maximizing, since MAC equals marginal damage.




i) denote the common value of the −c0
i
∗s. The
eﬃcient output condition (4) ensures that output is surplus maximizing be-
cause each ﬁrm’s marginal social cost equals marginal willingness-to-pay.
Note that, although condition (3) determines a unique emission rate for each
ﬁrm, condition (4) determines only the aggregate level of output. Any com-
bination of qi
∗s and ri
∗s such that the q∗







∗ is a solution to the surplus maximization problem.9
The social optimum can be supported as a competitive equilibrium un-
der cap-and-trade regulation. The regulator distributes Ai allowances to
each ﬁrm so that the sum of allowances granted equals the optimal level of
emissions,
PN
i=1 Ai = E∗. Letting Pc denote the price of allowances under




c = P(Q)qi − ci(ri)qi − wiqi − Pc(riqi − Ai). (5)




c) = Pc (6)
9This feature of the model is a direct result of the constant marginal cost of output
assumption. Unit cost, ci(ri
∗), is a function of emission rate but not output. If this
assumption were relaxed, condition (4) would imply a ﬁrm speciﬁc output level but would
result in a more complicated laboratory environment.
16if qi is greater than zero, and
P(Q
c) = ci(ri
c) + wi + ri
cPc. (7)
Equation (6) ensures cost minimizing abatement and deﬁnes each ri
c.
Equation (7) requires that each ﬁrm earn zero marginal proﬁt, and identiﬁes
Qc. The system (6) and (7) can be obtained from the optimal conditions (3)




∗) with Pc and ri
∗ with rc
i. The optimal
solution to the surplus maximization problem can be sustained as a cap-and-
trade competitive equilibrium and vice versa.
Under a baseline-and-credit plan, the regulator sets an industry-wide per-
formance standard, rs. This performance standard characterizes a relative
emission target mechanism. Firm i’s net demand for credits is (ri − rs)qi,
with negative values signifying a supply of credits. If the price of credits





b = P(Q)qi − ci(ri)qi − wiqi − Pbqi(ri − r
s). (8)




b) = Pb (9)
if qi is greater than zero, and
P(Q
b) = ci(ri
b) + wi + ri
bPb − r
sPb. (10)
Equation (9) is the usual eﬃcient abatement condition which deﬁnes each
ri
b. Equation (10) is the usual zero marginal proﬁt condition which deter-
mines Qb. Let us assume that the regulator sets the emission rate stan-





∗)/Q∗.10 If the emission standard is binding and net demand
























Equation (12) implies that, if market shares are equal under baseline-and-
credit and cap-and-trade plans, any set of emission rates satisfying the so-
cially optimal abatement condition (3) also satisﬁes the corresponding baseline-
and-credit equilibrium condition (9).
The baseline-and-credit zero marginal proﬁt condition (10) is similar to
optimal equation (4) with Pb playing the role of marginal damage, D0().
If emission rates are the same under the two cases (ri
b = ri
∗), then Pb =
D0(E∗) and the right hand side of (10) is equal to the right hand side of
(4), except for the term −rsPb. This negative cost term derives from the
Pbrsqi term of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function and represents a subsidy on output
causing the output price under baseline-and-credit trading to be less than
optimal. Consequently, because the demand curve for output is assumed
to be downward sloping (P 0(Q) < 0), aggregate output Qb will be higher
than aggregate output Q∗ chosen by the social planner. Since equal average
10As mentioned in the introduction, we will ﬁnd that setting the performance standard
equal to the optimal average emission rate will result in quantities of emissions and output
that are ineﬃciently high. We could set a stricter standard so that quantities of output and
emissions are optimal but then ﬁrm costs will be ineﬃciently high. Considering that both
methods yield ineﬃciency we choose to focus on the case comparing cap-and-trade with
a baseline-and-credit system with a performance standard equal to the average emission
rate from the optimal scenario.
18Table 1: Firm Cost Parameters
Optimal Optimal C&T B&C B&C
Firm Unit Emission Endowment Performance Initial
Type Cost u1 u0 α wi Rate Each Period Standard Credits
A 128 172 88 3 0 2 20 5 12
B 96 249 64 3 0 4 20 5 4
C 64 375 52 3 0 6 20 5 0
D 32 1852 29 3 0 8 20 5 0
Note: B&C is Baseline-and-Credit and C&T is Cap-and-Trade.
emission rates are imposed under both trading plans, this higher aggregate
output implies that aggregate emission levels will be also be higher under the
baseline-and-credit plan.
Note from (8) that, if a ﬁrm chooses an emission rate equal to the per-
formance standard, ri = rs, it will not create, nor be required to redeem,
any permits. Therefore, its output and emissions will be unconstrained by
the regulatory program. While cap-and-trade imposes a ﬁxed upper limit on
emissions, a baseline-and-credit plan implies that emissions will vary with
output.
3.2 Parameterization
Table 1 presents ﬁrm-speciﬁc parameters used in the sessions reported in
this paper. Figure 3 presents the four ﬁrm types’ marginal abatement cost
curves and their equilibrium emission rates of 2, 4, 6 and 8 associated with
the equilibrium permit price of $16. Firm types A, B, C and D have op-
timal equilibrium unit costs of 128, 96, 64 and 32, respectively. Figure 4
19Figure 3: Marginal Abatement Cost Curves
illustrates how the marginal social cost is equated across all ﬁrm types when
the marginal damage of emissions is equal to $16 and each ﬁrm chooses its
optimal equilibrium emission rate.
In the experiment, the demand for output is exogenous and is represented
by the inverse demand function P = 320−5Q, where P is the output price and
Q is the quantity demanded. Table 2 summarizes the associated equilibrium
predictions under the alternative emission trading mechanisms. It is useful
to illustrate the equilibria diagrammatically.
Figure 5 illustrates the cap-and-trade output equilibrium when only type
A and D ﬁrms are in the market and they are choosing their optimal equilib-
rium emission rates of 2 and 8, respectively. The dirty ﬁrms have long-run
average costs (LAC) of 32 and create damages of rDMD = 8×16 = 128 per
20Figure 4: Marginal Social Cost (and Long-run Average Cost) by Firm Type
Table 2: Variable Capacity Predictions
Price of
Trading Allowances Output Aggregate Aggregate Active
Institution or Credits Price Output Emissions Firm Types
B&C 16 80 48 240 A,B,C,D
C&T 16 160 32 160 A,B,C,D
Note: B&C is Baseline-and-Credit and C&T is Cap-and-Trade.
unit of output. Marginal social cost is 160. Firm type A has a higher unit
capacity cost at $128 but lower damages of rAMD = 2×16 = 32 per unit of
output, yielding the same marginal social cost. Optimal output Q∗
C = 32 is
determined by the intersection of the demand curve and marginal social cost.
At the optimal output, type A ﬁrms earn 160 − 128 = 32 in rent per unit of
21Figure 5: Cap-and-Trade Equilibrium
output, or 32/2 = 16 per unit of emissions. Type D ﬁrms earn 160−32 = 128
in rent per unit output, or 128/8 = 16 per unit of emissions. Both types of
ﬁrms are willing to pay $16 per permit. Under cap-and-trade, the regulatory
authority allocates 160 allowances and the allowance market clears at $16 per
permit. Long-run average cost is now $160 for each ﬁrm type. Equilibrium
at a price of $160 implies output of 32 units, and an average emission rate
of 5. The only way to achieve an average emission rate of 5 with type A
(rA = 2) and D (rD = 8) ﬁrms is to have equal output capacity of each ﬁrm
type. This equilibrium implies the presence of 16 units of capacity from type
A and 16 units of capacity of type D in the market.
Figure 6 shows the equivalent baseline-and-credit output equilibrium,
again assuming that the emission permit market is also in equilibrium. The
22Figure 6: Baseline-and-Credit Equilibrium
performance standard is rs = 5 units of emissions per unit of output. Re-
stricting attention to type A and D ﬁrms, we see this implies that there must
be equal capacity of each ﬁrm type. The eﬀect of baseline-and-credit trad-
ing is to equate the LAC of both ﬁrm types. Given equal capacity shares,
average LAC = (128 + 32)/2 = 80. This determines the ineﬃcient equilib-
rium output of 48 units, 24 from each ﬁrm type. At this point, type D ﬁrms
must buy rD − rs = 3 credits per unit of output and they are willing to pay
(80−32)/3 = 16 per credit. Type A ﬁrms create rs−rA = 3 credits per unit
of output. They must receive at least (128 − 80)/3 = 16 per credit to earn
non-negative proﬁts under baseline-and-credit. Since there is equal capacity
of type A and D ﬁrms (24 units for each type), the supply of credits equals
demand for credits at a price of $16.
233.3 Eﬃciency
We compute the eﬃciency of baseline-and-credit and cap-and-trade equi-
libria relative to the maximum surplus available. The social surplus is
equal to the sum of consumers’ surplus and producers’ surplus less any
environmental damage. In computing the environmental damages we as-
sume constant marginal damages of $16 per unit of emissions. From Figure
5 it is clear that under cap-and-trade consumers’ surplus in equilibrium is
0.5(320 − 160)(32) = $2560. Producers’ Surplus is (160 − 80)(32) = $2560,
the same amount. External damages are equal to total emissions multiplied
by the marginal damage, 160 × 16 = 2560. Note that this exactly oﬀsets
the producers’ surplus, so that total social surplus is equal to the consumer
surplus of $2560. Because the emissions cap was set to the socially optimal
level of 160 units of emissions, the cap-and-trade surplus values are optimal.
Using Figure 6, the corresponding consumers’ surplus, producers’ surplus, ex-
ternal damages and total social surplus under baseline-and-credit are $5760,
$0, $3840 and $1920, respectively.





It is convenient to decompose eﬃciency into components associated with
consumer surplus, producer surplus and external costs. Thus the consumer
surplus component of the eﬃciency index is




Table 3 reports the equilibrium values for total surplus and its components
under the two treatments.
24Table 3: Equilibrium Surplus and Eﬃciency
Components of Eﬃciency
Consumer Producer Environmental
Eﬃciency Surplus Surplus Damages
= + + -
Cap-and-Trade Equilibrium:
C&T Surplus $2560 $2560 $2560 $2560
Eﬃciency Index 100% 100% 100% 100%
Baseline-and-Credit Equilibrium:
B&C Surplus $1920 $5760 $0 $3840
Eﬃciency Index 75% 225% 0% 150%
Note: B&C is Baseline-and-Credit and C&T is Cap-and-Trade.
4 Results
Figures 7 to 12 provide an overview of the data.11 We have three independent
series in each treatment. The ﬁgures show the range and mean of observa-
tions for each period. Many series show a distinct time trend and general
convergence to equilibrium values over the ﬁrst half of each session. More-
over, the fact that there was no payoﬀ to subjects’ inventory of permits held
at the end of the session may have induced an end-game eﬀect in Period 20.
Accordingly, we drop the ﬁrst 9 periods and the last 2 periods in summariz-
ing the results numerically and report mean values for periods 10 through
18 in Table 4. We test for treatment eﬀects using parametric (t-tests based
on robust OLS regression techniques) and non-parametric methods (Mann-
11Appendix C posted at http://www.economics.mcmaster.ca/econ/mceel/ provides
analysis of the bid and ask data from each period to investigate whether subjects fully
comprehended the trading environment.
25Table 4: Mean Values over Periods 10 to 18 by Treatment
Output Output Aggregate Permit Market Permit
Capacity* Volume* Emissions* Price Volume Inventories
Cap-and-Trade:
Session 1 43.00 35.11 162.89 14.89 22.56 68.89
Session 2 31.67 30.00 159.78 18.44 40.33 36.11
Session 3 33.22 33.22 162.44 15.72 35.11 31.89
Treatment Mean 35.96 32.78 161.70 16.35 32.66 45.63
Prediction 32.00b 32.00b 160.00b 16.00b 32.00 0.00cb
Baseline-and-Credit:
Session 4 47.33 47.33 239.89 17.61 31.11 81.44
Session 5 45.33 45.22 230.44 20.44 24.56 42.67
Session 6 46.44 45.89 224.56 20.83 27.33 39.00
Treatment Mean 46.37 46.15 231.63 19.63 27.67 54.37
Prediction 48.00cb 48.00cb 240.00c 16.00b 48.00cb 0.00cb
* Treatment eﬀect is signiﬁcant using a t-test and a Mann-Whitney
U-test at a 5% critical level.
c The cap-and-trade treatment is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the prediction
using a t-test at the 5% level.
b The baseline-and-credit treatment is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the prediction
using a t-test at the 5% level.
26Figure 7: Capacity
Whitney U-statistics). However these tests have extremely limited power,
even adopting a critical level of 10%, so they should not be taken too seri-
ously.12
4.1 Capacity, Output and Emissions
Consider ﬁrst the key predictions on capacity, output and emissions. Figure
7 shows the evolution of capacity. Under baseline-and-credit trading, capac-
ity rises steadily to reach the predicted level, and stabilizes between 45 and
48 by period 9. Under cap-and-trade, capacity is highly volatile and ﬂuc-
tuates between 32 and 45 throughout the entire 20 periods. The treatment
12With a critical level of 10% there is about a 45% chance of detecting a true diﬀerence
in means of 1.5 standard deviations. We would need a critical level of 25% to get a 70%
chance of detecting this large a diﬀerence in means (two-tailed tests, common variance).
27Figure 8: Output Volume
eﬀect is strongly signiﬁcant as output capacities are signiﬁcantly higher un-
der baseline-and-credit trading. Figure 8 shows a similar pattern for output,
except that under cap-and-trade output exceeds the benchmark level of 32 by
only a small amount and much of the volatility has diminished. This suggests
pervasive underutilization of capacity under cap-and-trade due to inability
to acquire permits or super-optimal emission rate choices. As we will ﬁnd
below, this over-capacity under cap-and-trade yields an unexpected source
of ineﬃciency. Emissions in Figure 9 follow the same pattern as output.
28Figure 9: Aggregate Emissions
29Figure 10: Eﬃciency
Aggregate emissions under both treatments do not deviate signiﬁcantly
from their own benchmark equilibria. Emissions under baseline-and-credit
trading are signiﬁcantly greater, in terms of magnitude and precision, than
emissions under cap-and-trade regulation. In total, these observations con-
form well to the underlying theory.
These results imply that the eﬃciency losses from baseline-and-credit
trading will be similar to those predicted by theory. Figure 10 reports the
evolution of eﬃciency over the 20 periods. Table 5 reports the numerical
results. Eﬃciency was variable across the cap-and-trade sessions but was
more stable across the baseline-and-credit sessions. Two of the cap-and-
trade sessions attained above 90% eﬃciency, while the third achieved only
30Table 5: Mean Eﬃciency over Periods 10 to 18
Components of Eﬃciency
Consumer Producer Environmental
Eﬃciency** Surplus* Surplus* Damages*
= + + -
Cap-and-Trade:
Session 1 76% 121% 57% 102%
Session 2 91% 88% 102% 100%
Session 3 96% 108% 90% 102%
Treatment Mean 88% 106% 83% 101%
C&T Equilibrium 100%b 100%b 100%b 100%b
Baseline-and-Credit:
Session 4 72% 219% 3% 150%
Session 5 74% 200% 18% 144%
Session 6 73% 106% 7% 140%
Treatment Mean 73% 209% 9% 145%
B&C Equilibrium 75%b 225%cb 0%c 150%c
* Treatment eﬀect is signiﬁcant using a t-test and a Mann-Whitney U-test
at a 5% critical level.
** Treatment eﬀect is signiﬁcant using a t-test and a Mann-Whitney U-test
at a 10% critical level.
c The cap-and-trade treatment is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the prediction
using a t-test at the 5% level.
b The baseline-and-credit treatment is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the prediction
using a t-test at the 5% level.
3176%. Mean eﬃciency in the three cap-and-trade sessions was just below
the predicted level of 75%. Due to the variation in cap-and-trade eﬃciency
levels, the diﬀerence in treatment means is signiﬁcant at the 5% level using
a Mann-Whitney U-test but only at the 10% level using a t-test. Treat-
ment eﬀects were signiﬁcant at the 5% level for each of the three compo-
nents of surplus, however. Under cap-and-trade consumer surplus, producer
surplus and damage were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent benchmark predictions.
Under baseline-and-credit trading producer surplus and emission damages
were close to the benchmarks while consumer surplus was signiﬁcantly less
than expected, although still higher than in the cap-and-trade treatment.
4.2 Credit and Allowance Markets
Figure 11 shows similar trends in permit prices across treatments over the
entire 20 periods. In cap-and-trade permit prices are consistently very close
to the benchmark and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from it. While the variance
in prices is high in the ﬁrst few periods, this quickly disappears by the ﬁfth
period. In baseline-and-credit, credit prices start just above the predicted
equilibrium level of 16 and remain fairly stabile at this level over the 20
periods. Although the prices in each treatment are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from each other, the fact that credit prices consistently stay 3-4 dollars above
the predicted equilibrium price leads to credit prices diﬀering signiﬁcantly
from the predicted level. It is interesting to note that the extremely high
initial credit prices found in the partial experimental environments reported
in Buckley (2004) and Buckley et al. (2005a) are not exhibited in the full
long-run environment investigated here.
32Figure 11: Permit Trading Prices
Unlike the extraordinarily high permit inventories held in the baseline-
and-credit treatments reported by Buckley, Muller, and Mestelman (2005a),
Figure 12 shows a build-up and general working oﬀ of permit inventories over
the 20 periods under both trading plans. While Table 4 provides evidence
that inventory levels are signiﬁcantly above the predicted level of zero over
periods 10 to 18, it also shows that inventories are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
between the two trading plans.13
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Theory predicts higher aggregate output and emission under baseline-and-
credit than under cap-and-trade when the former imposes a performance
13Positive inventories in periods 1 to 19 can be consistent with risk-averse preferences.
33Figure 12: Aggregate Inventory
34standard consistent with the cap under the latter plan. This is because a
performance standard acts as a subsidy on output. Despite this prediction,
baseline-and-credit emission trading systems currently being used around the
globe. The question remained, however, whether the theoretical predictions
regarding the two mechanisms would hold in real markets. This paper reports
results on controlled laboratory sessions in an environment involving variable
emission technologies and variable output capacities.
Results from the experimental sessions reported here support the theory.
Using graphical and tabular data, we have conﬁrmed that, while cap-and-
trade emission and output levels stay close to their predicted equilibrium
values, emissions and output soar and converge to their predicted higher
levels under baseline-and-credit. Despite ﬁrms building super-optimal ca-
pacities under cap-and-trade, these capacities do not deviate enough from
the optimal level to lead to signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the realized cap-and-
trade eﬃciencies from their optimal levels. However, the ineﬃcient levels of
environmental damages under baseline-and-credit are signiﬁcant enough to
render baseline-and-credit trading signiﬁcantly less eﬃcient than cap-and-
trade emission trading.
An experimental has now been designed and tested. This paper reports
sessions involving variable emission rates and capacities, building on previous
experiments which held capacity or emission rate ﬁxed. With the theoreti-
cal framework and corresponding experimental environment in place, future
work can now assess the long-run properties of these alternative trading plans
in more realistic environments involving ﬁrm compliance, ”credit for early ac-
tion” regulation and output demand volatility and growth.
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